tion from real tax liabilities.
Introduction
With legislation passed in 1981, the federal government made its first move W HEN an income tax is based upon toward indexing-bracket widths, the nominal income, then in general ' the personal exemption, and the standard dereal burden of taxation depends upon the duction are now adjusted annually by the rate of inflation. The most popularly rate of change in the consumer price inunderstood way in which inflation affects dex. As is well known, these provisions 3 taxes is "bracket creep." As nominal in-went into effect in 1985 . Somewhat less come increases, the individual is pushed well known is that prior to 1985, ten states into brackets with higher marginal tax adopted some kind of indexing provisions rates. Hence, the proportion of income that for their own personal income tax sysis taxed increases despite the fact that real tems. And even less well known is that of income stays the same. Another effect of these ten states, seven suspended their inflation occurs because exemptions and indexing laws for one or more years. So the standard deduction are set in nominal much for commitment.
terms. Increases in the price level de-The purpose of this paper is to examine crease their real value, again increasing the states' experience with income tax inthe effective tax rate. ' dexing and see what lessons can be drawn Inflation, then, leads to unlegislated from it. Section 11 provides a description increases in the real burden of the income of the relevant statutes. Section III extax. Aaron [1976, p. 101 points out that amines the circumstances that led some for the federal income tax, historically states to adopt indexing, and why some of these effects have been mitigated by a se-them subsequently reneged on their ries of ad hoc reductions in statutory rates. promises. Section IV concludes with a Such cuts in the federal income tax were summary, suggestions for future reenacted in 1969, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1977, search The price index tion were covered; food, fuel and property used is the Phoenix Consumer Price In-tax credits were not. The index amount dex (CPI) for the fiscal year ending in the was to be set annually by the legislature. ar. The implied changes in bracket If the legislature failed to take action, the tax ye widths, etc., are rounded down to the law specified a default amount: 6 percent nearest $10.
for the period 1978 85, and 3 percent One peculiarity of the Arizona law is starting in 1986. that the standard deduction is over-in-Does Colorado's law represent true indexed. In 1978, the standard deduction was dexine. Clearly, if the legislature can set 10 percent of Adjusted Gross Income, with the adjustment factor without reference a minimum of $500 and a maximum of to any external standard, the commit-$1000. The Arizona statute indexes not ment to keeping the real tax function uno I the minimum and maximum changed is weakened. On the other hand, n y amounts, but also the percentage rate used the law does embody a commitment to rein the calculation.
By 1985, the percent-view the inflation situation annually, a age rate was 18.3 percent, with a mini-commitment that is backed up by the mum of $917, and a maximum of $1834.
presence of the default option. In any case, When we contacted the Arizona tax au-in 1983 these considerations became moot
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for the citizens of Colorado when the law standard deduction and general credit for was suspended for each of the years 1983 years , 1981 years onward. In 1980 years , indexing was re-1984 years and 1985 pealed for the low income deduction, a Iowa adopted indexation temporarily for slightly curious move for a state with a 1979 and 1980, and made it permanent in reputation for being liberal. At the same 1980. Only the income brackets and an time, brackets were to be adjusted by a annuity exclusion were indexed; the stan-different factor than other amounts: the dard deduction, personal exemption and bracket adjustment was 85 percent of the general credit were not. The adjustment change in the Twin Cities CPI of the 12 factor used for 1979 was 25 percent of the months ending in August of the tax year; change in the CPI for the entire U.S. For other items were adjusted by 100 percent 1980 and subsequent years, 50 percent of of that change. The standard deduction the change in the GNP deflator was spec-was rounded to the nearest $100; the ified. Interestingly, indexation was made rounding error was not to be carried forconditional on the presence of an unob-ward. Other items were rounded to the ligated general fund surplus of sixty mil-nearest one dollar. lion dollars at the close of the fiscal year.
A number of important changes were This event has not occurred since 1978. In made in Minnesota's law in 1981; i) Each effect, then, Iowa built reneging right into
year, every taxpayer's taxable income is its statute. One should note, however, that multiplied by a "Taxable Net Income Adthe law indicating the size of the surplus justment Factor" (TNIAF), a number is also subject to change. which, when multiplied by each taxpay-Maine adopted an indexation law for er's taxable income, ensures that average 1981 and subsequent years via a refertaxable income will grow at the same rate endum held in 1982. The years specified as average gross income. The TNIAF is in the preceding sentence are not typobounded below by one. This factor was ingraphical errors. Indexing was passed in troduced to meet concerns that the 1979 a voter initiative held early in 1982, and law was leading to a reduction in the real the initiative stipulated that indexing value of the tax base. (The main element would apply to taxes on 1981 income due in this erosion was the fact that (uninin 1982. The initiative was challenged in dexed) federal tax payments are deductcourt on the basis of its retroactivity, The ible on Minnesota tax returns, so as fed-Supreme Court of Maine ruled that the eral tax liabilities grew, Minnesota tax initiative was legal, but meanwhile the collections fell.) ii) The adjustment factor legislature managed to postpone applica-was based on the change in the CPI for tion of the law until 1983. The personal urban consumers (CPI-U) for the 12 exemption and the standard deduction months ending in September of the tax were indexed, but only for those in in-
year. However, the adjustment factor could come brackets below $15,000 for single not exceed the rate of increase in Minindividuals and separate returns, $22,500 nesota gross income. iii) Brackets were to for heads of households, and $30,000 for be indexed at 100 percent of the adjustjoint returns. These limits were also in-ment factor, not the previous figure of 85 dexed. The property tax credit was not inpercent. iv) Brackets were to be rounded dexed. The adjustment factor was 50 per-to the nearest $10, with rounding errors cent of the increase in the U.S. CPI during not carried forward. Taking items i) the twelve months ending in June of the through iv) together, we can infer that tax year, but not more than 7 percent.
making the system comprehensible was Values were rounded to the nearest $10, not a major consideration in the design of and roundoff errors were not carried for-the Minnesota indexing law. ward.
Another feature of the 1981 law was a Minnesota adopted indexing for 1979. provision for automatic suspension of in-Brackets were to be indexed for 1979 on dexing in periods of financial stringency. ward; and the low income deduction, However, this section was repealed in 1985 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLI when it became apparent that it might Arizona's figure of 16.0 for 1980 means actually go into effect. A new rate sched-that the 1980 tax parameters were deterule was introduced at that time.
mined by applying a 16 percent adjust-Montana adopted indexing for 1981 on-ment factor to their 1979 values. For purward via a referendum held in 1980. poses of reference, the last line records the Bracket widths, the personal exemption percentage change in the U.S. CPI as a and the maximum standard deduction
whole. An asterisk (*) indicates that inwere to be adjusted each year by the dexing was promised for that year, but was change in the U.S. CPI-U for the months then suspended. ending in June of the tax year. Brackets Table 2 . 1 does not do justice to the hetwere rounded to the nearest $100, and erogeneity of the various indexing statother items to the nearest $10. Rounding utes across states; however, a tabular errors were carried forward.
representation of all the provisions would Oregon adopted indexation in 1979 for be unwieldy. In any case, if we seek to tax years 1981 onward. Only the personal assess the impact of a given state's indexexemption was indexed. In 1982, the law ing statute, we must view it in the conwas suspended retroactively to 1981. text of the rest of that state's tax code. Moreover, during the years 1983 1985, However, the tax codes themselves differ the personal exemption itself was tem-dramatically from state to state, both with porarily removed, and replaced by a gen-respect to the tax base and tax schedule. eral credit, which was not indexed. In ef-(See Feenberg and Rosen [19861.) These fect, then, indexing was removed. In 1985, considerations suggest that a sensible the change from an exemption to a credit characterization of the extent of indexing was made permanent, and the credit was must embody some sort of comparison beindexed to the Portland CPI, beginning in tween the revenue yield of the actual (in-1986. dexed) tax system, and what the yield South Carolina adopted indexing in would have been in the absence of index-1980, effective in 1982. Only bracket ing. Specifically, let Rb be a state's revewidths were affected. However, in 1983, nue during a given year. Now suppose that before 1982 taxes were paid, the effective prices and incomes increase at rate a. Let date was postponed to 1984 and the ad-R, be the associated revenues given that justment factor reduced to 25 percent of year's indexing law, and R. the revenues the CPI. For 1985, the adjustment factor that would have been generated without 4 used was twenty-five percent of that in indexing. Thus, under the indexing law, the federal tax law for bracket widths, and real revenues increase from Rb to R,/(l + 100 percent for the standard deduction and 7r), while withoout indexing, they would personal exemptions.
have increased from Rb to &/(l + iT). Our Wisconsin adopted an indexing statute measure for the extent of indexing is in 1979, effective for 1980. Only income brackets were indexed; the personal ex-R,/(l + Tr) -Rb emption, standard deduction, rent, prop-I -1erty, and general credits were not. The R,,/(l + ir) -Rb adjustment factor was the June to June change in the CPI for the entire U.S. mi-Thus, I measures the proportion of the innus 3 percent. Indexing was suspended in flationary increase in real taxes that is 1983.
returned to the taxpayer by the indexing law. Note that with a perfectly indexed B. Summary tax, real tax burdens are unchanged by inflation, i.e., R,/(l + 7r) Rb. In this case, Table 2 .1 summarizes some of the in-I -1. formation from this discussion. For the Because the tax schedules are nonlinperiod 1978-1985, it shows for each state ear, a state's value of I in a given year the adjustment factor applied to whatever will in general depend upon 1T. If one wants items were indexed. Thus, for example, to examine the evolution of the various Table 3 .1 therefore presents tent to which voters in the next election several different measures: the elasticity will be influenced by support for index-. and ing; iii) the extent to which voters in fuof revenues with respect to income, the marginal tax rates on individuals with ture elections will reward legislators who 532 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XL @tedfor indexing in the past; and iv) the portunities for future tax reductions. This vi extent to which voters in future elections tends to reduce support for indexing. The are influenced bY a series of ad hoe tax second effect of increased progressivity is to increase the present value of the stream decreases.
Thus, as a state's income tax structure of tax reductions implicit in the indexing beconies more progressive,8 there are two law. This tends to increase support for ineffect's that work. in opposite directions.
dexing. In short, the tradeoffs inherent in ',,@5 3 -----------First, as progressivity increases, so does the decision to iridex are made more drathe cost of indexation in terms of lost op-matic when progressivity increases.
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Whether this tends to increase or de-A final variable that might affect the crease the probability of indexing cannot indexing decision is the inflation rate itbe known a priori.
self. Indexing would not be an issue at all Another variable that might affect the if inflation were always zero. Perhaps the indexation decision is the importance of "correct" model is simply that states adopt the personal income tax in the state's rev-indexing when the inflation rate is high, enue system. Suppose that the costs to and then drop it when the inflation rate legislators of enacting a tax indexing is low. statute do not vary proportionately with With respect to the reneging decision, the size of the income tax. In particular, we expect the same variables to operate there might be fixed costs in terms of time as in the decision to index. Nevertheless, spent organizing a coalition, putting the we note in passing that in a number of statute through the legislative process, etc.
conversations with state government of-If such is the case, then it would be less ficials, we were told that the main reason worthwhile to enact an indexing statute for reneging was to deal with a financial when the income tax is relatively unim-crisis. Issues of tax structure never Came portant. In short, we expect that as the up in these discussions. proportion of state tax revenue attribut-' able to the personal income tax increases,
B. An Econometric Model of Indexing so does the probability of indexing, ceteris Status paribus.
The state's financial environment might In this section we construct a Markov also affect the indexing decision. One ex-model of states' indexing and reneging pects that when a state is under financial decisions. In any given year, a state's instress, its legislators will be unlikely to come tax system can be characterized by abandon a potentially important source one of three conditions: it is indexed; it is of revenue, ceteris paribus. Hence, we ex-not indexed and has never been indexed; pect states with large debt burdens to be or it is not indexed, but the state has reless likely to adopt indexing.
neged on an earlier promise to index. The We consider next variables that might probabilities of moving from one condibe reflective of a state's "tastes" for in-tion to another (transition probabilities) dexing. Income levels might affect the po-are defined in Figure 3 .1. Thus, the first litical views of voters and their elected row indicates that if a state fails to index representatives; hence we will examine the initially, the probability that it will stay impact of per capita income on the index-non-indexed is (1 p); with probability p, ing decision. As suggested earlier, an-then, it will join the ranks of the indexing other indicator of the political environ-states. The third cell in the first row is ment is the presence of a tax or zero because by definition, a state that has expenditure limitation (TEL) statute. never promised to index cannot renege. Perhaps a TEL is indicative of an under-Similarly, from the second row, the problying desire to curtail government, in ability that an indexing state retains inwhich case the presence of a TEL would dexing is (1 q); the probability that it increase the probability of indexing. Al-reneges is q. The third row implies that ternatively, it could be that if a state has reneging is an absorbing condition-once adopted a TEL, its citizens require no ad-a state reneges, it never goes back to inditional instruments to control the size of dexing. Obviously, from a theoretical point the public sector. In this case, the pres-of view this need not be the case, and inence of a TEL would reduce the probabil-deed, there are several counterexamples ity of indexing. In any event, however, care in Table 2 .1. As a practical matter, howmust be taken in assessing the relation-ever, so few reneging states have actually ship between TELs and indexing, because returned to indexing that it would be inthe decisions to adopt them may be made feasible to estimate the probability of that jointly.
event. [Vol. XLI
We assume that transitions from period that they renege in period t + 1. A state t to t + 1 depend on variables dated pe-that reneges is assigned a one; a state that riod t. While we could make p and q func-remains indexed receives a zero.'o tions of different variables, in practice we Implementing the statistical model recould think of no basis for including some quires that the x, vector be specified. As variables in one decision and not the other.
noted earlier, we use debt per capita to Hence, Pt -p(xt) and qt -q(xt), where x represent "fiscal stress"; per capita inis a row vector. Assuming the convenient come and a TEL dichotomous variable to logit specification we can write represent "political tastes"; and the share of the income tax in total revenues to ex' b measure the importance of income taxatb F(xtb), and (3.1) tion. As also observed above, the income Pt 1-+ ex tax structure itself can be characterized extg F(xtg), (3.2) by several different variables."
We estiqt 1 + eNg mate our equations with two alternative measures, the elasticity of revenue with where b and g are parameter vectors. respect to income, and the difference beor variable which tween the marginal tax rate at $40,000 of Let d, be an indicat taxable income and that at $10,000. Fitakes the value 1 if a state has no indexnally, in order to estimate the impact of ing in Period t and remains unindexed in the inflation rate on the indexing deciperiod t + 1, and zero otherwise; and d2 sion, in some variants we include it in xt. = 1 if a state starts out being indexed and All equations are estimated using data stays that way, and zero otherwise. Then from 1977 to 1984. That is, the first tranthe likelihood function associated with sition is from 1977 to 1978, and the last (3.3) the probability of indexing is a function of the elasticity of the income tax system (e), the ratio of income tax revenue to towhere T is the number of years in the tal revenue (s), and per capita debt saMple.9 (DEBT). The positive coefficient on s in-At first glance the maximization of (3.3) dicates that the more important the inappears to be a messy nonlinear problem. come tax is in a state's tax structure, the However' due to the Markov indepen-higher the probability that it will adopt dence assumption, L separates into two indexing. This is consistent with our earconventional logit equations, so that lier argument that there are fixed costs standard software routines can be used.
to enacting indexing statutes, and hence Logit 1 selects observations that are not indexation is less likely to be adopted when indexed in period t, and computes the the income tax is a relatively unimporprobability that they become indexed in tant component of the state's revenue system, period t + 1. A state that becomes indexed is assigned a one; a state that re-
The positive coefficient on e shows that niains non-indexed receives a zero. Logit more elastic tax systems have a higher 2 selects all observations that are indexed probability of being indexed. The coeffiin period t, and computes the probability cient on s exceeds its standard error by a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The debt variable is scaled so that it is measured in hundreds of dollars factor of 2.1; for e the t-ratio is 1.93. In costs of diminished chances for success in terms of our earlier discussion of the two future elections. The state's financial poeffects that increasing progressivity can sition as measured by DEBT also has an have on the probability of indexing, ap-impact-the larger its per capita debt, the parently the second is dominant. That is, less likely that a state will adopt indexthe increased likelihood of a success in the ing. This coefficient, moreover, is signifnext election more than outweighs the icant at conventional levels (t -2.14). We defer to later a discussion of the quan-times its standard error. 13 titative significance of the coefficients.
In short, the results from Table 3 .2 in-We conjectured earlier that the impact dicate that whether we use changes in of the form of the income tax structure marginal tax rates or elasticities as meashould depend on the relative importance sures of tax structure, the main qualitaof the income tax in the state's revenue tive result is the same. Namely, tax syssystem. This conjecture is examined in tems that are more prone to produce column (2) of Table 3 .2, which shows the increasing real tax rates in the presence outcome when s is omitted from the in-of inflation are more likely to be indexed. dexing logit. As expected, failure to con-This effect shows up most strongly when trol for the relative importance of income the income tax system is characterized by taxation renders the income tax structure its overall income elasticity. insignificant as a determinant of the in-We also experimented with an alterdexing decision. Omission of s is a serious native measure of fiscal stress, the state's specification error. Note also that the deficit in the year prior to which indexing coefficient on DEBT falls both in absolute was adopted. In all cases, DEFICIT did terms and relative to its standard error "worse" than DEBT in the sense of havwhen s is omitted from the equation.
ing smaller t-statistics.
(These results are In order to assess the robustness of the available upon request.) Apparently, one results in column (1), we re-estimated the particular year's fiscal experience looms logit equation entering the "taste" vari-less important in the indexing decision ables mentioned above, i.e., TEL and Y. than the cumulative effect of all past fis-The results, shown in column (3) of Table cal decisions as measured by the debt. 3.2, indicate the following: 1) Neither Next, in order to investigate the pos-TEL" nor Y adds significantly to the ex-sibility that the inflation rate affects the planatory power of the equation (al-indexing decision, each of the equations though Y is "close" with a t-statistic of in Table 3 .2 was re-estimated including 1.83). However, the point estimates sug-the inflation rate as a right hand side gest that the probability of indexing var-variable. The results, reported-in Table  ies positively with each variable. 2) The 3.3, suggest that: a) the inflation rate is coefficients on the tax structure and debt not statistically significant; and b) its invariables are fairly robust with respect to clusion does not affect the qualitative rethe inclusion of TEL and Y. Compared to sults in the rest of the table very much. their counterparts in column (1), the coef-Of course, it would be silly to interpret ficients on e and DEBT are larger in ab- Table 3 .3 as saying that inflation has solute value, and the coefficient on s is nothing to do with indexing decisions. smaller. But the basic story is unchanged.
What the Table does say is that during Thus far, our main substantive conclu-our sample period, variations in the insion is that the more progressive the in-flation rate do not do a very good job of come tax structure, the greater the prob-explaining when states chose to index. ability of indexing, ceteris paribus. We now So far we have confined our discussion investigate whether this conclusion holds to the qualitative aspects of the results. up under an alternative notion of "pro-To obtain a sense of their quantitative gressive." Specifically, we characterize the significance, we assumed that the indexstates' income tax structures by the change ing decision was governed by the paramin the marginal tax rate when taxable in-eters in column I of Table 3 .2, and simcome goes from $10,000 to $40,000, de-ulated the response of the probability of noted (t40 -tio). The outcome is reported indexing in a given year, p, to changes in in column (4) of Table 3 .2. The point es-the various right hand side variables. To timates suggest that income tax systems begin we evaluated equation (3.1) at the with more rapidly increasing marginal tax mean values of the x,s and found p rates are more likely to index, ceteris par-0.00636. " We then re-computed (3, 1) sev ibus. However, the coefficient on (t40 tjo) eral times, each time increasing a single is imprecisely estimated: it is only 1.52 right hand side variable by one standard deviation, and leaving all others at their they have adopted indexing. As noted means.
above, to be included in the sample for this The simulations are reported in Table  equation , a state must commit itself to in-3.4. The tax structure variables have very dexing. Consequently, the number of obpowerful effects on p. A change in the servations is much smaller than that for elasticity from 1.59 to 2.03 almost dou-the indexing equation. Mechanically, the bles the probability of indexing. An in-dependent variable for each observation crease in the share of income taxes in to-is determined as follows: After the time tal revenues from 0.26 to 0.39 more than the indexing commitment is made, a state triples the probability of indexing. The is assigned a value of zero for each year effect of fiscal stress is also important.
In-the state continues to index, and a one if creasing per capita debt from $500 to $885 it reneges. Once a state reneges, it is out cuts the probability that a state will in-of the sample. dex by a factor of about 7.
The estimates are presented in Table  2 . The Reneging Decision. We next turn 3.5. As one would hope, they tend to mirto states' decisions to renege given that ror the results for the indexing equations 3. In the period 1978 1984, several confined to sub-national levels of governstates were over-indexed. That is, when ment. nominal incomes rose, real tax revenues Finally, our paper has discussed the refell. This phenomenon was due to the de-sponse of states' indexing decisions to the ductibility of (unindexed) federal tax li-structures of their tax systems, but it has abilities on state returns. not attempted to account for differences 4. A state's indexing status depends on in the tax structures themselves.
Reits tax structure, inter alia. The more that cently, several papers have examined real tax burdens increase with income, the cross-sectional differences in the choice of more likely is a state to index, and the tax instruments." Such papers attempt less likely it is to renege. (However, the to explain why, for example, some juriseffects on the decision to renege are im-dictions rely more heavily on income taxprecisely estimated.) ation than others. They pay little atten-5. States with high levels of per capita tion to the fact that the tax instruments debt are less likely to index, and more themselves vary substantially with relikely to renege on a promise to index. spect to their progressivity. Investigating Do these results tell us anything about the sources of tax structure heterogeneity the prospects for continued federal in-is an important topic for future research. come tax indexing? Clearly, it is not necessarily true that federal and state declsion-making are governed by the same ENDNOTES process. Suppose, however, that similar ***We are grateful to George Jakubson, Whitney considerations do come into play. If so, the Newey, Richard Quandt and seminar participants at current high levels of federal debt to-Harvard, Johns Hopkins and Princeton for useful gether with the decrease in marginal tax comments; to John Capeci for assistance with the rates associated with the Tax Reform Act computations; and to the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-8419238) for financial support. of 1986 suggest a strong possibility that 'Less well understood, but also important, is the fact indexing will be repealed. In this context, that even with a simple proportional tax, inflation it is interesting to note that at various changes the effective tax rate on capital income. This is because the inflationary components of capital gains times, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and interest income are subject to tax. We do not deal the United Kingdom, and Canada adopted with this issue in the present paper. some form of automatic adjustment 'For a discussion of the macroeconomic consequences of tax indexing, see Pierce and Enzler [19761. of individual income tax rate brackets and 3SiX states (Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, North exemptions for inflation. Yet the adjust-Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah) base their taxes, ments were either omitted or reduced frein part, on indexed portions of the federal law, thus quently to avoid the revenue reductions
